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Repositioning the Dutch in the Atlantic,
1680–1800
GERT OOSTINDIE & JESSICA VANCE ROITMAN
After some decades of historical debate about the early modern Atlantic, it has
become a truism that the Atlantic may better be understood as a world of connec-
tions rather than as a collection of isolated national sub-empires. Likewise, it is
commonly accepted that the study of this interconnected Atlantic world should be
interdisciplinary, going beyond traditional economic and political history to include
the study of the circulation of people and cultures. This view was espoused and
expanded upon in the issue of Itinerario on the nature of Atlantic history published
thirteen years ago—the same issue in which Pieter Emmer and Wim Klooster
famously asserted that there was no Dutch Atlantic empire.1 Since this controver-
sial article appeared, there has been a resurgence of interest among scholars about
the role of the Dutch in the Atlantic. With Atlantic history continuing to occupy a
prominent place in Anglo-American university history departments, it seems high
time to appraise the output of this resurgence of interest with an historiographical
essay reviewing the major works and trends in the study of the Dutch in the Atlantic.
As part of this appraisal, it has become clear that despite the increase in publi-
cations on, and interest in, the Dutch in the Atlantic, there has been no compre-
hensive approach to the study of the Dutch in the Atlantic during the early modern
period. Therefore, the goal of this article is two-fold. We consider the recent devel-
opments in the study of the Dutch in the Atlantic, particularly as foregrounded
against the over-arching and constantly developing field of Atlantic history. But we
also seek to redress this absence of a framework in which to investigate the multi-
faceted role of the Dutch in the Atlantic by suggesting an approach centred on what
we term nodal points, that is the geographical spaces in which connections, inter-
sections and interactions can best be analysed. We urge an approach that at once
embraces the structure of the nation-state by looking at specifically Dutch nodal
points, while recognising the limitations of focusing on any nation as a sole frame
of reference in the imminently entangled Atlantic of the early modern period.
Thus, we will first discuss the state of the art in the historiography on the Dutch
Atlantic, in particular its resurgence in the past decade, but also its tendency to stick
to traditional subjects and approaches. The next section in the article proposes a
typology of the Dutch Atlantic, with an emphasis on its connections to the wider
Atlantic world. This typology is based, in part, on the recent output of scholarship 
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that we review in the first section. We then go on to address the paradox that stalks
all historians of the Atlantic: the desire to understand the Atlantic as an integrated
whole over and against the logistical exigencies that seem to inexorably push rese-
arch that focused on one “national” sub-empire. With developments in Atlantic
history serving as a backdrop, we will then define our own position within the con-
text of the existing approaches to the Dutch in the Atlantic. By way of a prelimina-
ry conclusion, we offer some hypotheses and questions regarding the defining
characteristics of the “Dutch” Atlantic and its place in the Atlantic world, as seen
through the lens of a cis-Atlantic approach centred in and on nodal points.
1. The Historiography of the Dutch Atlantic: An Appraisal
In the mid-1980s, at a time that few Dutch historians paid attention to their own
Atlantic history, the American geographer D.W. Meinig emphasised the importance
of the Dutch in the Atlantic. Meinig’s four-volume The Shaping of America: A
Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History already employed what David
Armitage would later describe as a large-scale cis-Atlantic approach.2 Meinig’s work
described interrelationships within vast regions of the Atlantic and then drew con-
clusions on the impact these broader linkages had on specific (smaller) regions.
This method of analysing the Atlantic led Meinig to a refreshing focus on the suc-
cesses of Dutch commerce in the Atlantic, rather than on colonisation per se.
Instead of building a colonial empire, Meinig stressed, the Dutch became important
agents in several Atlantic trading circuits such as the slave trade between West
Africa and the Caribbean and the trade in tropical products between the Caribbean
and Europe.3 Thus Meinig presented the Dutch Atlantic “empire” as a geographi-
cally fragmented network of strategic nodal points along critical trade routes.4
Directly and indirectly, Meinig’s work seems to have led to a revisionist impulse
amongst scholars of the Dutch in the Atlantic. Certainly, the 1990s and early 2000s
saw a marked increase in publications about the Dutch in Atlantic.5 The Dutch
Research Council (NWO) funding of a project on “Dutch Atlantic Connections”
between 2008 and 2012 results, in part, from this impulse, and from the questions
raised by the contributors to Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic
Trade and Shipping, 1585–1817, a volume of essays published in 2003. This col-
lection was the product of a symposium held on “Dutch Atlantic Shipping,
1600–1800” at Leiden University in 1996.6 All were concerned, ultimately, with
revisiting, revising, and reassessing the traditional (Dutch) historiography about the
value of the Atlantic to the Dutch both economically and, to a much lesser extent,
socially and culturally. And this re-examination of the history of the Dutch in the
Atlantic seems to have borne fruit. Not only is far more research being done into all
aspects of the Dutch in the Atlantic, but much of what was justifiably decried in
2003 as an “academic imbalance” in favour of the study of the Dutch East Indies is
being redressed.7 Dutch Atlantic history is no longer the purview of a few scholars
engaged in a small niche of the Dutch past, but is a growing and dynamic field of
interest in both national and international academic institutions.
Looking back on the developments of the historiography of the Dutch Atlantic,
several conclusions are clear. First, until relatively recently, the entire subject was
significantly under-studied, and what research was done focused either on the
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Dutch West India Company (WIC) or on individual colonies in the Atlantic.
Suriname is the best-researched single colony, followed by New Netherland,
Curaçao, Dutch Brazil, Elmina, and St. Eustatius, with the nearly forgotten colonies
of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo lagging far behind in terms of scholarly inter-
est.8 But few of these studies on individual colonies or settlements take a broader
Atlantic perspective. For example, in studies of Suriname, slavery and the plantation
economy are the most extensively researched subjects—with analyses of trade and
finance almost exclusively focusing on relations between metropolis and colony,
with little or nothing done to contextualise this colony in the greater Atlantic world.9
Indeed most of these studies all but ignore the larger Atlantic context of these
colonies. The Atlantic may have been overlooked or viewed as a somewhat embar-
rassing interlude in an otherwise more successful colonial past, due at least partly
to the financial failures of the WIC, especially when compared to the Dutch East
India Company (VOC).10 But this snubbing of the Atlantic could just as well stem
from the relative lack of importance of the West Indies in the nineteenth century and
the concomitant significance of the East Indies during this vital period for the foun-
dation of Dutch history writing.11 Certainly, there have been Dutch scholars who
have focused on the Dutch Atlantic, but with the possible exception of the Dutch
slave trade which is, by definition, a subject that has to be at least somewhat con-
textualised within an Atlantic perspective, most of these scholars were firmly
entrenched in the field of colonial history and viewed warfare, trade, and colonisa-
tion within a specifically or predominantly Dutch framework.
Moreover, within this colonial history perspective the vast majority of works deal-
ing with the Dutch in the Atlantic focus primarily on trade. For instance, one of the
first books to appear after Meinig’s Shaping of America was Jonathan Israel’s
Dutch Primacy in World Trade in 1989.12 Though not intended to situate itself with-
in the colonial history genre, among other controversial theses was Israel’s asser-
tion that the Atlantic had been of great importance for the economic development
of the Dutch Republic. In contrast to prevailing opinion which emphasised the lim-
ited number of Dutch colonial possessions in the West and their minor economic
importance to trade and industry in the Dutch Republic, Israel focused on the role
of individuals and private concerns rather than on the WIC itself, and showed how,
in the first half of the eighteenth century, these private undertakings had been quite
successful.13
A year later, Johannes Postma published The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade,
1600–1815. Clearly focused on commercial issues—in this case the slave trade—
the book also placed the history of the Dutch in the Atlantic firmly in the prevailing
currents of Anglo-Saxon Atlantic historiography.14 Likewise, in 1992, Pieter Emmer
and Ernst van den Boogaart published a Spanish-language volume entitled, La
expansión holandesa en el Atlántico which sought to place Dutch expansion in an
Atlantic perspective.15 Emmer continued engaging the largely Anglo-Saxon debates
on slavery and on Dutch trade in the Atlantic in his collection of essays The Dutch
in the Atlantic Economy, 1580–1880, published in 1998.16 On the first page, he
asks why the history of the Dutch expansion in the Atlantic has been neglected and
concluded, in part, that this “negligence in studying the Atlantic past is [because]
the Dutch were not very important in that part of the world,” and goes on to write
that it “seemed more attractive to concentrate on the history of the Dutch in Asia.”17
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Emmer’s questioning of the importance of the Atlantic for the Dutch Republic
continued in The Dutch Slave Trade, 1500–1850, published in 2006, in which he
argues that the Dutch had a relatively insignificant share in the Atlantic slave
trade—averaging 5 to 6 per cent of the total.18 However, he contends that the Dutch
did have a significant role in the development of the trade in the first half of the
seventeenth century, not only through supplying their short-lived Brazilian colony
with slaves, but, perhaps more importantly, by stimulating the cultivation of sugar—
with the consequent demand for slaves this entailed—in the French and English
Caribbean. The Dutch then turned to Spanish America, transporting around
100,000 slaves to this region by 1730.19
Working in the same economically-focused vein as Emmer, Jan de Vries and Ad
van der Woude wondered in their book The First Modern Economy: Success,
Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815, published in 1997,
if, apropos of the loss of Dutch Brazil, “the Dutch were too rational to be good
imperialists.”20 While emphasising the importance of the Republic’s Atlantic trade in
comparison to its Asian trade, de Vries and van der Woude’s overall analysis is that
“The 200 year history of the Dutch Atlantic economy is one of repeated cycles of
hope, frustration, and failure.”21 Some of the hopeful moments in the Dutch Atlantic
economy were the innovations provided by the commercial system, which made
the frustrations even greater when these were marginalised by the mercantilist
endeavours of France and Britain.22 There was also hope to be had from the re-
creation of colonial production centres, when the value of Dutch plantation exports
grew at an average rate of 2.8 per cent per year, making it “easily the most dynam-
ic sector of Dutch trade in the eighteenth century.”23
Eight years after this seminal book, Jan de Vries’ essay, “The Dutch Atlantic
Economies,” reiterates that the Dutch presence in the Atlantic world “has long
appeared both unimpressive and unimportant”.24 Summarising many of the argu-
ments he and van der Woude made in The First World Economy, he states that the
Netherlands’ engagement with the Atlantic was “filled with frustration and disap-
pointment, never resulting in a territorial, political or cultural presence that
answered to the grand visions of successive generations of advocates.”25 Never-
theless, he goes on to state that “historians have long been inclined to depreciate
too much the importance of the New World to the Dutch Republic”.26 Viewing Dutch
involvement in the Atlantic through the lens of merchants and investors in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, de Vries emphasises how the Atlantic was
perceived as an important zone of commercial activity, in which the failures of
colonisation and attendant assertion of political power were not particularly lament-
ed.27 In fact, de Vries shows that by the 1770s the Dutch imported more from the
West Indies than from Asia. De Vries expands upon this analysis in an article from
2010 in which he shows that in the 1770s, imports from the Western Hemisphere
accounted for nearly one third of total imports for the British, French, and Dutch,
as opposed to about 11 per cent for Asia, and this is without including other
European countries, especially Spain and Portugal. At the same time, de Vries’
figures also indicate that the importance of Atlantic trade was relatively more impor-
tant to the British and French than it was to the Dutch.28
De Vries’ economic analysis is further bolstered by Clé Lesger’s data on the taxes
paid by ships coming into Amsterdam’s harbour, which shows the growth in ship-
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ping from the New World in the last half of the eighteenth century.29 Recently, Henk
den Heijer has argued that about 70 per cent of Dutch activities in the Atlantic were
beyond the purview of the WIC. Two examples he names are sugar and tobacco,
commodities with which the WIC had nothing to do.30 Along these lines, Wim
Klooster’s dissertation, published in 1998, demonstrated the importance of the
Atlantic for the Dutch Republic by showing the importance of the Caribbean trade,
most of which was not officially registered and is therefore difficult to quantify.31
Most of these works have reshaped the traditional (Dutch) historiography about
the value of the Atlantic to the Dutch economy, and even some authors such as
Klooster and de Vries who were initially somewhat dismissive of the importance of
the Atlantic for the Dutch have since modified their views. Yet all of these scholars
still tend to structure their research within a predominantly Dutch framework. With
the exception of Klooster’s Illicit Riches, there are few publications that consider
the Dutch Atlantic in light of entanglements with other empires, and works that
incorporate the motives, perspectives, and strategies of other empires and their res-
idents.32 This is an approach in which studies of the colonial period in North
America excel. Joyce Goodfriend has been tireless in calling for the inclusion of the
Dutch in the narrative of British North America, work that scholars such as Jaap
Jacobs have aided.33 Both Claudia Schnurmann and April Lee Hatfield demonstrate
the importance of communities of Dutch settlers for the development of Virginia
and Boston, as well as New York.34 And they look not only at the economic impor-
tance of these Dutch settlers for the British Atlantic, but also at the development of
what Schnurmann dubs a “supra-national” identity based on regional interests and
economic, social, and cultural entanglements.35
In conclusion, there has been a serious effort at catching up over the past two
decades, and yet the historiography of the Dutch Atlantic and its connections to the
wider Atlantic is clearly lagging behind, not only in quantity, but equally when it
comes to multidisciplinary and innovative approaches. For example, the historiog-
raphy of the Dutch in the Atlantic described above is overwhelmingly economic in
its orientation. We have said nothing of works of social or cultural history, not
because we are remiss but because there are simply so few. Other than tightly
focused studies of the cultural and social life of individual colonies, there is next to
nothing written on the Dutch in the Atlantic that addresses broader themes such as
the transfer of ideas, political integration, and the social and cultural impact of the
Atlantic on the Dutch Republic. The one looming exception to this statement is the
work of Benjamin Schmidt, who studies the influence of ideas of the Atlantic on the
Dutch Republic.36 In addition, Klooster has written about the development of unique
colonial identities within the context of “centre and periphery.”37 Thus, one under-
stands why Laura Cruz characterised Dutch historiography, in general, and Dutch
Atlantic historiography in particular, as conservative.38
2. The “Dutch” Atlantic, 1680–1800:
Periodisation and Characteristics
So what does this historiography allow us to say about the Dutch in the Atlantic?
What are the defining characteristics of the Dutch Atlantic and its wider connections
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between 1680 and 1800? What developments were crucial to the formation of the
Dutch Atlantic, and what periodisation is most appropriate?
Basic Assumptions
One of the basic tenets of Atlantic history is that the study of this vast space should
not be reduced to national categories, but should, instead, supersede them by
crossing and combining borders of all kinds. Linkages between the various nation-
al empires characterise the early modern Atlantic world so much that it is well-nigh
impossible to detect where one empire begins and the other ends. We suggest that
the “Dutch Atlantic” is the most radical case for this statement. There was no such
thing as a homogeneous Dutch empire in the Atlantic, and conversely, several
Dutch colonies were disproportionally active as hubs between various sub-empires,
and Dutch merchants and financiers were remarkably active throughout the wider
Atlantic.
What about the “Dutch” character of the Dutch Atlantic? In a comparative
perspective, the character of the various Dutch colonies and settlements was excep-
tionally heterogeneous. But does this mean that the overseas territories were
unreflective of metropolitan culture? Not necessarily. For one thing, there were
typical metropolitan transfers to the various Atlantic settlements, such as in
arrangements regarding governance and jurisprudence as well as, among the white
settlers, the dominance of the Dutch Reformed Church, a tolerance for other reli-
gious groups, and the (not necessarily majority) usage of the Dutch language. We
may also argue that the lack of uniformity in policing the various colonies and the
resulting contrasts between them reflects a similar lack of centralisation within the
Dutch Republic itself, just as the low level of mercantilism within the Dutch Atlantic
reflects Dutch governance at home.
We will briefly focus on Dutch national politics; geopolitics; economy; demogra-
phy and ethnicity; and cultural transfers and the circulation of ideas in order to flesh
out and systematise our arguments. First, though, we will explain our demarcations
of the period under study. We have opted for geopolitical markers to delineate our
chronology. The year 1680 marks the beginning of relatively stable period. By then,
the Dutch had opted for settling in Elmina rather than further South in the Luanda
region, had lost Brazil and New Netherland, and had conquered Suriname, Berbice,
Demerara, and Essequibo, as well as the six Antillean islands. Some brief disrup-
tions aside, this sub-empire would remain intact until the start of the Napoleonic
Wars at the turn of the nineteenth century. By then the WIC had already gone bank-
rupt (1792). What happened afterwards—events such as the French occupation of
the Netherlands and the British seizure of the Dutch colonies, the abolition of the
slave trade, and so forth—while interesting and not unimportant, are not the con-
cern of this article and, therefore, will not be explored.
National Politics, Governance Arrangements, Geopolitics
For the entire period under study, government in the Dutch Republic was based on
provincial assemblies and ruling municipal councils. Provinces had a great deal of
power, with the province of Holland and, particularly, the city of Amsterdam striving
for (and often attaining) national hegemony. Thus, the political structure of the
Dutch Republic was much less centralised than that of other European states with
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a direct stake in the Atlantic. Moreover, the Netherlands was not a monarchy, in
contrast to other nations engaging in Atlantic endeavours. This meant that within
the Republic a complex set of actors had an interest in, and rights to dictate policy
over, particular colonies or even over the entire Dutch Atlantic. For instance, the
States-General transferred part, but certainly not all, of its power to the WIC, a com-
pany without a monopoly and divided within itself along Dutch provincial and
municipal lines. And of course this was a company competing with and sharing
overseas engagement with different sets of ad hoc institutions, merchant houses
and such.
Governance arrangements within the various colonies mirrored this state of
affairs in the metropole. Rather than one uniform model for colonial rule, there was
a rather unstructured set of divergent governance models for what may only very
loosely be defined as “the Dutch Atlantic.” We do see changes over time, though.
The Republic first attempted to farm out settlement in the colonies partly through
the WIC, partly through mixed semi-state, and also via strictly private, initiatives.
The latter option, the so-called patroons—parcels of land grants—were issued to
applicants with the understanding that they would ensure its colonisation with at
least fifty colonists within three years’ time. The applicants had administrative and
judicial powers over their land. At later stages, these patroonschappen were con-
verted to mixed chartered companies, but these too retained a considerable degree
of local autonomy.39 These sorts of settlement schemes met with limited success
and died out fairly quickly. Their legacy endured, however, in the form of diverse and
often divergent governance structures in the colonies. By the 1730s, the WIC had
lost its commercial monopoly but remained the principal governmental institution.
Within the WIC, conflicts between Holland, particularly Amsterdam, and Zeeland
continued to have a disruptive effect on colonial rule, with Zeeland increasingly
relegated to a secondary role, but fighting tooth and nail against this relegation until
the late eighteenth century.
In the colonies, the WIC acted as the sole government in the Antilles, but had to
share this role elsewhere. In 1682, Zeeland was forced to relinquish Suriname as a
provincial asset, and four years later governance was entrusted to a “Sociëteit van
Suriname” in which the Amsterdam-dominated WIC and the city of Amsterdam
would be preeminent throughout the period under analysis. Likewise, after a start
as a patroonschap belonging to a colonist from Zeeland, control of Berbice was
transferred in 1720 to a “Sociëteit van Berbice” established by Amsterdam mer-
chants; in both cases, the WIC had delegated much of its authority. Essequibo was
run solely by private parties up to 1670, and, thereafter, by the Zeeland chamber of
the WIC. After the mid-eighteenth century, conflicts over trading and investment
rights divided the Zeeland oligarchy and Amsterdam merchants. In general,
throughout this entire period, local government enjoyed a good deal of practical
sovereignty (reluctantly) delegated by the WIC in matters such as the administration
of justice, the making of treaties, and the maintenance of military forces.40
As for geopolitics, the loss of two of the first Dutch endeavours in the Atlantic
(Dutch Brazil and New Netherland) testifies to the short span of the Republic’s lead-
ing role in Europe and, by extension, the Atlantic. By the late seventeenth century,
the Dutch political and military edge among the Western European states had
evaporated, and the Republic’s expansionist ambitions dissipated. Dutch shipping
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capacity remained relatively high, but military strength was limited, and so was the
Dutch Atlantic sub-empire. It was not really a territory to boast of, whether in com-
parison to the realm controlled by the VOC in Asia or to the Iberian, British or
French presence in the Atlantic.
And yet this lack of empire, in the commonly understood sense of the word, and
inadequate military resources did not stand in the way of successful intra-Atlantic,
cross-imperial trade. For one thing, it made the Dutch more flexible in their eco-
nomic policies while their competitors still clung at least officially to mercantilism.41
The neutral position of the Republic in the eighteenth century was even favourable
to Dutch trade in the Caribbean. Islands like Curaçao and St. Eustatius emerged as
free-trade hubs and were frequently used by the Caribbean colonies of competing
and even warring parties for the import and export of commodities and tropical
products. St. Eustatius was even lauded by political economists Adam Smith and
Thomas François Raynal for its prosperity stemming from a free-market approach.42
But, as would become clear many times throughout the period under study, the
lack of military power made the Dutch colonies and their Atlantic trade vulnerable,
particularly to the British and the French.
The Dutch Atlantic Economy
The Dutch Republic had a significant domestic demand coupled with a transit mar-
ket for Atlantic produce. There was, therefore, room for trade in staple products
produced both in the Dutch as well as in the British and French Atlantic colonies.
This, in turn, stimulated the emergence of a capital market and financial institutions
covering the entire Atlantic. Of course, this was not exclusively an Atlantic affair,
given the heavy Dutch involvement in intra-European and Asian trade and finance
even prior to the beginning of their Atlantic endeavours. And, certainly, this was not
an economy steered exclusively by the WIC. Whereas the VOC had a monopoly in
governance as well as trade in the East Indies, the WIC had to abandon such aspi-
rations early on. In 1730, the WIC relinquished its last remaining monopoly—the
slave trade—and the company ceased to engage in slave trading itself by the end
of that decade.43 Extracting taxes on private trade would become its major econom-
ic activity. Nonetheless, while the WIC would continue to be an economic failure, we
see a pronounced increase in the importance of the Atlantic to the Dutch economy
as a whole.
Until the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch role in the Atlantic was based large-
ly on the production of its colonial possessions. New Netherlands, for example,
provided the Republic with beaver and otter pelts, Elmina and Angola with gold,
ivory and the income earned by selling enslaved Africans in the Americas, and Brazil
with sugar and dyewood. But paradoxically, a new reality came into being after the
collapse of the early Dutch Atlantic empire in the middle part of the seventeenth
century. While the Dutch Republic was at the height of its economic and maritime
power, it was downgraded to a minor player in the Atlantic if we judge its position
based on the significance of the Republic’s own colonies. But, as the essays in
Riches from Atlantic Commerce demonstrates, despite this seemingly poor show-
ing, the economic role of the Republic and its colonies in the Atlantic suffered less
than might be expected. The next phase was one of geopolitical contraction but
economic expansion.
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In contrast to traditional views on the subject, the Dutch Atlantic economy in the
early modern period was not limited to the African slave trade and the development
of slavery-based plantation colonies in Brazil and, later, the Guyanas. Dutch ship-
ping and trade in the entire Atlantic was of far more importance than has been
routinely assumed, precisely because of Dutch activities outside of the Republic’s
own colonies. Dutch Atlantic trading demonstrated structural growth throughout
much of the period under consideration. In spite of the loss of their Atlantic
“empire”, the Dutch were able to create a profitable niche market based on their 
trade in the Americas. According to Klooster, in the mid-eighteenth century the Dutch
share of the total trade in the Atlantic amounted to a not insignificant 8.5 per cent.44
Upon closer consideration, this percentage posited by Klooster should be even
higher, as his estimate does not include the production of the plantation colonies
of Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara, nor does it include the indirect imports of
tobacco, sugar and other tropical products via British and French port cities. In
general, it should be emphasised that, while the Dutch colonies in the West may
have been small and few, Dutch and Dutch Caribbean merchants operating there
succeeded in rerouting part of the production of the surrounding Spanish, French,
and English colonies. The estimated value of Dutch imports from and via its own
colonies of Curaçao, St. Eustatius and Suriname rose from 4.3 million guilders at
the beginning of the eighteenth century to 18.5 million guilders at the end.45 Once
we include the trade figures from North America, growth is even more spectacular.
One caveat should be made, however. Though we now know that Dutch Atlantic
trade was more significant than heretofore assumed, it is not evident that the
contribution of the Atlantic to the Dutch economy and its growth in the eighteenth
century was remarkable in comparison to the domestic, European or Asian trades.
It is not even certain that the Atlantic trade was actually on par with the significance
of the Atlantic to the economies of other European powers.
Nevertheless, we have drawn some preliminary conclusions based upon the cal-
culations on Dutch Atlantic trade offered by Jan de Vries, Wim Klooster and Victor
Enthoven.46 Over time, these historians have all corrected their trade figures
upwards. These upwards corrections are, to a large extent, based on having broad-
ened the definition of what constituted “Dutch Atlantic trade”. For instance, the
initial estimates of Klooster only pertained to shipping between the Republic on the
one hand, and Curaçao, St. Eustatius and Suriname on the other. The most recent
estimates also include Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, as well as West Africa
(Elmina). Meanwhile, Enthoven, in particular, also makes a strong point for includ-
ing direct trade relations between the Dutch Republic and the North American
colonies.47
While there is room for some scepticism regarding the estimates, as all of these
three scholars readily admit, all figures point to a strong growth in the value of
Dutch Atlantic trading in the eighteenth century. According to de Vries, the annual
value of Atlantic imports into the Republic stood at some 4.5 million guilders in the
mid-seventeenth century, then dropped, but rose again and quadrupled between
1700 and 1780, from an annual 4.3 to 22.4 million guilders. Enthoven produces a
much higher figure for ca. 1780—over 30 million—including imports from non-
Dutch territories in the Americas. This would only strengthen the case for vibrant
growth throughout most of the eighteenth century.48
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A comparison to the value of imports into the Republic from Asia provides
remarkable results. De Vries calculates that initial values of Asian imports were far
above Dutch Atlantic imports: some 8 million guilders in the 1640s, gradually
rising to some 20 million in the period 1750–80. The contrast is clear: Asian import
growth was much lower, and, in the 1770s, West Indian imports surpassed Asian
imports. Not surprisingly, Enthoven’s figures suggest an even greater discrepancy.
He copies de Vries’ estimate of the value of Asian imports c. 1780 at 20 million
guilders in comparison with 30 million for Atlantic imports. He suggests that the
total trade turnover (including re-exports of colonial produce and Dutch exports)
was 37.9 million guilders for the Dutch Asian trade which was set over and against
an astounding 70 million for Dutch Atlantic trade.49
On the basis of this research we may safely conclude that this growth eventually
made the Atlantic as important to the Republic as the Dutch Asian orbit, and,
perhaps, even more significant. Unlike Asian imports, the tropical products from the
Atlantic provided primary materials for Dutch industry and, hence, had significant
spin-off effects for the economy. For instance, the Republic’s European trade
included a significant volume of transhipped French Caribbean sugar destined for
Dutch refineries. All of which leads to a rectification of the established opinion that,
for the Dutch Republic, the Atlantic was always of secondary importance in
comparison with Asia. But this correction still does not help us answer two other
comparative questions.
First, was the growth of Dutch Atlantic trade remarkable vis-à-vis the other
Atlantic players? The answer is simple: no. The Dutch were minor players in the
Atlantic. Klooster estimates that the Dutch share of the trade in American products
was 5 per cent in the 1720s and 1730s and 8.5 per cent in the 1740s and 1750s.
This proportion would rise if we were to include trade with the other Guianas and
North America. Yet even if these additional trade figures were included, the Dutch
still would not have been a player in the same league as Portugal, England or
France, much less of Spain. De Vries compares the value of Atlantic imports into
Geographical structure of imports to Britain, France, and the Dutch Republic in the 1770s
________________________________________________________________________________________
Britain France Netherlands
________________________________________________________________________________________
Source of imports 1772–73 (%) 1772–76 (%) 1770–79 (%)
________________________________________________________________________________________
Europe 45 53 71
Western Hemisphere 38 42 15
Asia 16 5 14
Total value (in millions) £13.6 l.t. 369.6 ƒ 147.4
________________________________________________________________________________________
Total value of imports to Britain, France, and the Dutch Republic in the 1770s
(millions of guilders)
________________________________________________________________________________________
Source of imports Britain France Netherlands Total % of total imports
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Western ƒ 57.4 ƒ 71.9 ƒ 22.4 ƒ 151.7 ƒ 32.3
Hemisphere
Asia 24.2 8.6 20.0 52.8 11.2
Total 151.1 171.1 147.4
________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Jan de Vries, “The limits of globalization in the early modern world,” 729.
Note: Exchange rates: one guilder (or florin (ƒ)) = 11.11 pounds sterling and 2.16 livres tournois (l.t).
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Britain, France, and the Dutch Republic in the 1770s, and demonstrates that the
Dutch were a minor player in comparison to the British and the French. Of course,
per capita Dutch involvement was more or less comparable to that of the British or
French. But that obviously does not change the overall conclusion that the Republic
was a minor player; it merely underlines the fact that that Republic itself was a
relatively small nation. When we evaluate the figures based on the total imports for
each of these nations, the results are noteworthy. Only in the Dutch case are the
Asian and Atlantic trades of comparable magnitude. But both colonial trades were
dwarfed by European imports.
All of this reminds us that we should be cautious in our revisionism. Certainly, an
inaccurate perspective on the (lack of) importance of the Atlantic trade for the
Dutch Republic emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the fruits
of colonialism were almost uniformly equated with the wealth created in the Dutch
East Indies. Early modern Dutch Atlantic trade was, indeed, more important than
has long been acknowledged, but, even so, its importance to the Republic should
not be exaggerated. So a conservative revision of the historiography is the most
realistic outcome of the latest figures which we have enumerated above. But these
figures in no way tell the entire story when it comes to the importance of Dutch con-
nections within the Atlantic. After all, trade from the Dutch Guianas, Curaçao and
St. Eustatius with the North American colonies, as well as with other Caribbean
islands, is not included in the above figures—and this trade involved not simply the
circulation of commodities, but equally of people and ideas. The importance of this
sort of circulation is nearly impossible to quantify, but is no less significant for this
lack of quantification.
Demography and Ethnicity
In the first century after the Spanish conquista, indigenous populations in much of
what would become the Dutch Atlantic had been decimated or pushed to the
periphery by immigrants from Africa and Europe.50 With the exception of West
African Elmina, the Dutch colonies in the Atlantic were mainly populated by immi-
grants, the great majority of whom were enslaved Africans and their descendants,
and only a minority Europeans. Citizens from the prosperous Republic were not
eager emigrants, and a considerable share of the European population in Dutch
colonies, whether transients or settlers, originated from outside the Republic.
Moreover, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the share of the
total European population in the Dutch colonies remained comparatively small, the
only exception being the Cape Colony, the extreme western point of the Republic’s
VOC orbit. After the 1660s, immigration was mainly to the Caribbean colonies, with
just a trickle to Elmina and larger numbers to North America, which was no longer
a Dutch-controlled territory.
It is extremely difficult to calculate the number of Atlantic emigrants coming from
or travelling via the Republic. This difficulty stems not only from missing or elusive
figures, but also from what definitions we employ. For example, do we count only
the number of people who crossed the Atlantic with the intention of settling, or do
we include those who intended to settle for a limited period? Or should we include
all passengers and crews on all ships leaving the Republic for either Elmina or the
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Americas? And do we only count inhabitants of the Republic, or do we add anybody
embarking on a Dutch ship?
David Eltis, using calculations made by Jan Lucassen, arrives at a very conserva-
tive estimate of 20,000 migrants between 1600 and 1760, only 4 per cent of the
approximately half a million migrants that Asia did. At the other extreme, Enthoven
has arrived at a staggering number of 1,872,000 people leaving the Republic for
Atlantic destinations between 1600 and 1800, and 1,205,500 returning, meaning
that, by his estimates, 700,000 “migrants” either settled in the Atlantic territories or
died along the way. However, as Gijs Kruijtzer argues, this figure is inflated because
it includes ships’ crews and military men (hence one sailor or soldier crossing the
Atlantic five times will count as five individuals). Moreover, Enthoven includes large
contingents of non-Dutch emigrants transhipped by Dutch ships, including the
approximately 100,000 Germans and Scandinavians who went to North America
and later became known as the “Pennsylvania Dutch.”51
It seems safe to assume that the number of Dutch citizens crossing the Atlantic
to settle elsewhere was modest, certainly in comparison to those settling in the VOC
orbit, but also in comparison to the European population in other parts of the
Atlantic. Around 1735, some 5,000 Europeans were living in all the Dutch Atlantic
colonies taken together, in 1750 perhaps around 8,500, and by about 1800 just
over 16,000. These figures do not include Dutch settlers and their offspring in non-
Dutch territories, particularly in North America, where their number increased
considerably, possibly from just over 8,500 in 1700 to over 100,000 in the late eigh-
teenth century.52 There is no doubt that Dutch Atlantic population growth was more
substantial than in the Republic itself, where the total population increased at a very
low rate, from just below 1,900,000 around 1650, to just over that figure in 1750,
and to 2,100,000 by about 1800.53
As was the case with Dutch involvement in Atlantic trade, figures for Dutch
migration and settlement indicate that the Republic was an active, empire-crossing,
but nonetheless numerically modest player in the wider Atlantic. Over one million
Europeans settled in British America between 1600 and 1800, three quarters of
these in North America. The total white population of British America increased
roughly from 110,000 in 1660 to 320,000 in 1710, and then grew again to
1,325,000 in 1760, before declining dramatically to approximately 465,000 around
1800 due to the loss of the thirteen North American colonies which became the
United States of America.54 Estimates for French Atlantic migration up to 1800 vary
from 100,000 to 300,000. Around 1730, the total European population in the
Americas may have been 73,000, a figure that increased significantly in the next
decades—St. Domingue alone grew from 10,400 in 1730 to 31,600 in 1780.55 Eltis’
calculations for European migration to the Atlantic between 1500 and 1760 indi-
cate that Britain, Spain and Portugal, respectively, were the three most important
nations of origin, followed distantly by France and, lagging even further behind, the
Dutch Republic.56
Proportions and segmentation between immigrant populations varied widely
within the Americas. The European element in the Iberian colonies was stronger
than elsewhere, as was the share of the mestizo and Eurafrican population. In the
typical plantation societies of other nations, the European element was small, usu-
ally ranging between 5 and 10 per cent. This applied to the Dutch plantation
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colonies in the Guianas as well, but less so for the trade colonies of Curaçao and
St. Eustatius, where the European and mixed segments taken together formed a
significant part of the total population. This, of course, had profound consequences
for patterns of creolisation within the Dutch Atlantic orbit.
The very concept of “Dutch” is problematic in reference to those Dutch who were
peopling the Atlantic world. As applied to the European inhabitants of settlements,
plantation colonies, and trade factories throughout the Atlantic the term “Dutch”
could refer to people who were born in these regions, who had come there as
migrants, or who were the descendants of immigrants from the Dutch Republic
itself. In practice almost any white citizen living in the Dutch colonies and/or work-
ing in the Dutch Atlantic trading companies was considered Dutch, despite hailing
from another part of Europe and, perhaps, being unable to speak Dutch at all. Post-
hoc identification is made more complicated by the fact that the English called
anyone who was not French or Spanish “Dutch” because they were all “Deutsch”
or, in some way, Germanic.57
For the Dutch Republic itself, unlike its other European competitors, economic
development was highly dependent on immigration, and so was the human capital
employed in overseas ventures. Flemish and Sephardic immigrants were key play-
ers in the early phases of Dutch Atlantic expansion, while migrants from other parts
of Europe, especially the German states and Scandinavia, were crucial in Dutch
military campaigns and as sailors. No other European power deployed so many
foreigners as part of their imperial venture, whether as soldiers, sailors or adminis-
trators.58 In the Caribbean, Dutch ships’ crews were increasingly mixed, consisting
of European, free coloured and enslaved African sailors.59
Throughout the Dutch colonial orbit, Europeans born outside of the Republic
were a strong minority or even a majority in the total white segment of the popula-
tion.60 And the Dutch case is not entirely exceptional. The heterogeneity of
European populations is vastly underestimated in the study of empires, in general.
Looking back in history through the lens of the nation-state, historians tend to
project an unduly unified view of a group of people overseas. Take, for example, the
only European state that, according to Klooster and Emmer, could be viewed as
actually having an Atlantic empire—the British. Even this empire was created, in
part, by Scots and Irish (both subject peoples in English eyes and their own), as well
as Jews and even a fair number of Dutch.61 The Spanish and Portuguese empires
were partially peopled by the so-called New Christians and a whole panoply of other
Europeans, and major financing for the Iberian overseas enterprises came from
these New Christians, as well as the Genoese. As historian Tamar Hertzog, shows,
it was not just Jews and Genoese, but a whole host of groups who populated the
(Spanish) Americas.62
That being said, it is likely that the “Dutch” were more heterogeneous in their
Atlantic endeavours than were other European states. This is not surprising. A con-
siderable part of the population of the Republic itself was of recent immigrant stock,
and its strong economic growth in the early phase of colonisation implied a
demand for external migratory labour, mostly from Scandinavia, the German states
and the north of France.63 This is not to say there were no “real” Dutch settlers. In
the seventeenth century, for example, hundreds of emigrants from Zeeland settled
on the Dutch Windward Islands of Saba, St. Eustatius and St. Martin. These
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remained small-scale settlements, however, and quickly lost their Dutch charac-
ter—by the early eighteenth century Dutch was already a disappearing minority
language.64
In conclusion, then, it is even more problematic to think of the Dutch colonies in
the Atlantic as extensions of the metropolis than it is in the case of the other
European empires. This has a host of obvious implications for the study of Dutch
Atlantic cultures and processes of creolisation. But it should alert us again to the
importance of minority ethnicities and non-Dutch actors in the building of networks
within the Dutch Atlantic and beyond.
Culture and Ideas
From the above it stands to reason that there was considerable ethnic and cultural
diversity within the Dutch Atlantic. To give but one example, the dominant language
in Suriname was an English-based Creole (Sranan), in Curaçao a Spanish- and
Portuguese-based Creole (Papiamentu), and in St. Eustatius a probably creolised
version of English. Only in Berbice and the Danish Virgin Islands did a Dutch-based
Creole develop. In the same vein, it is not particularly surprising that a visitor to St.
Thomas in the 1830s observed that Papiamentu was much spoken in this Danish
colony—the language was brought there by migrants, both free and enslaved,
arriving on the island from ailing Curaçao in the late eighteenth century.65
The implications are manifold and extend beyond the issue of culture and creoli-
sation within the constituent parts of the Dutch Atlantic, which is in and of itself an
extremely interesting topic. Economically and demographically, ethnic and cultural
heterogeneity must have helped in shaping cross-imperial connections. At the
same time, the internal heterogeneity may have affected the geopolitical cohesive-
ness and the interconnectedness of the Dutch Atlantic as a whole. We may wonder
how this affected the emergence, or lack thereof, of a West Indian interest uniting
all players with an economic interest in things Atlantic. For instance, there is little
indication of the emergence of a Creole elite linking up with a West Indian interest
in the Republic.66
As for the circulation of news and ideas, we may safely assume that these trav-
elled relatively easily within the Atlantic and certainly also within the Republic and,
hence, to the rest of Europe. Benjamin Schmidt has shown that pamphlets and
broadsheets about the Americas had a lasting impact on the Dutch Republic—and
not just on the elites—and spread from there to the rest of the continent. Thus the
Republic remained the major producer of imagery of the Atlantic even as its own
geopolitical presence declined, and, as such, continued to have a profound influ-
ence in the wider Atlantic world and beyond. On the other hand, we cannot be sure
how this influenced public culture and mentalities within the Republic itself. The first
question is, of course, how many within the Netherlands really learned about and/or
had any personal relations with the Atlantic. Return migrants from the colonies
might have cemented more classic imperial relations, but so far as we know return
migration only involved small numbers of people. Surely the consumption of cru-
cial Atlantic commodities such as sugar, coffee and tobacco increased, and the
traction given to Dutch industry from these Atlantic endeavours generated employ-
ment opportunities for the working classes. But did this raise awareness of the
Atlantic as a Dutch entity as a whole? Who else but upper- and middle-class absen-
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tee landowners, merchants and civil servants were really aware of the wider Dutch
Atlantic? We have no idea. What we do know is that in the late eighteenth century
there was nothing like the Atlantic awareness that propelled the British abolitionist
movement.
Periodisation
The Atlantic requires its own periodisation. Most histories of early modern Europe
end at 1789 and the French Revolution. However, ending studies of the Atlantic at
this point bisects the so-called “Age of Revolution” in the Atlantic at a particularly
vital point. As Donna Gabaccia points out, by the mid-eighteenth century, a long
series of anti-colonial rebellions in North and South America, Europe, and the
Caribbean had unfolded, and continued well into the nineteenth century in the
Americas and Caribbean.67 Alison Games argues similarly when she notes that,
“The Atlantic’s age of revolution began in the British Atlantic world in the 1770s with
the revolution that created the first republic in the Atlantic. It continued through the
revolutions in France and Saint Domingue, the thwarted uprising of the United
Irishmen, and into the early nineteenth century with the wars for independence in
Latin America.”68 In fact, Gabaccia argues for a much longer chronology for Atlantic
history, in general. She believes that extending studies of Atlantic history into the
nineteenth century makes far more sense.69
Along these lines of developing a separate periodisation for the Atlantic, two of
the doyens of Atlantic history, Bernard Bailyn and John Elliott, have independently
formulated tripartite chronologies of Atlantic history that are largely comparable.
Bailyn terms the first an “era of contested marchlands” while Elliott calls it an “era
of occupation.” For Bailyn, the era of contested marchlands was dominated by vio-
lence and profound disorientation on the part of Europeans, Native Americans, and
Africans. It was a period of extended, violently brutal, barbarous, genocidal conflict
on contested marchlands or frontiers.70 For Elliott, this first phase of Atlantic histo-
ry, beginning shortly after Columbus’ voyage, was an age of intrusion, exploitation,
devastation, and subjugation. Bailyn and Elliott both describe harsh confrontations
with the native population, plundering, the institution of unfree labour, and the
reconstruction and renaming of American spaces as hallmarks of this initial period
of European engagement with the Atlantic.71 However, there were clear differences
between the empires, as well. The Spanish occupation was based on dominating
people and the construction of cities and towns, and was furthered by their practice
of cohabitation with indigenous Americans.72 In contrast, this phase was, for the
British, predicated on the commodification of land, was largely rural, and nor-
malised the segregation of Europeans from Native Americans.73
The second stage is called “integration” by Bailyn and “consolidation” by Elliott.
Both historians note growing integration and interdependence of the respective
empires. There was an increasing uniformity and the assertion of metropolitan con-
trol from Spain and Britain, though Elliott notes the divergent trajectories of power
between the Spanish and English during the second half of the seventeenth centu-
ry.74 The last phase is one of “creole triumphalism” and “emancipation.” Although
there were clear differences between the Spanish and British empires in this phase,
both historians see it in similar terms. It was an era of revolution, especially of
revolutionary ideas, with societies growing and expanding their frontiers, which
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ultimately led to throwing off metropolitan control and the creation of new nations.
As cogent and convincing as Bailyn and Elliott’s tripartite schemes are, the Dutch
Atlantic does not fit into them. The first phases may have some merit when applied
to the Dutch case, but the third—Creole triumphalism—is hardly applicable to the
Dutch Atlantic at all. This is evident if one looks at the stagnation of Suriname’s
plantation economy beginning in the 1770s, the British take-over during the
Napoleonic Wars, the subsequent decline of Curaçao and Statia, and the decrease
of the slave trade resulting in the decline in the importance of Elmina dating from
the last quarter of the eighteenth century, decades before abolition. The only late-
eighteenth-century economic success story is Demerara, but this would soon
become a British triumph, rather than a Dutch creole one.
In 2005, Jan de Vries proposed an alternative, four-phase, periodisation for
Dutch economic activities in the Atlantic, of which three were situated in the early
modern period.75 The Dutch started to explore the Atlantic in the late sixteenth cen-
tury. In the initial years, which lasted until the founding of the WIC in 1621, Dutch
trade in the Atlantic was driven by small private shipping companies. During the first
phase (1621–54) the WIC conquered Northeast Brazil and several Portuguese trad-
ing posts in West Africa. But, in the long run, the company was unable to enforce
a trade monopoly and to consolidate its Atlantic possessions. With debts piling up
and a lack of military and political support at home, the WIC finally retreated from
Brazil in 1654.
De Vries’ second phase started after the loss of Brazil and lasted until 1713.
During this period the Dutch diverted their attention to supplying other European
colonies in the Atlantic with commodities and services. As a result of this policy,
colonial products like sugar and tobacco kept arriving in the Republic. But at the
end of the seventeenth century, the Dutch were ousted from this trade by English
and French mercantilist measures. The final blow to the second phase was the loss
in 1713 of the asiento, the monopoly over the slave trade to the Spanish colonies
via Curaçao.
During de Vries’ third phase, which lasted until the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War
(1780–84), the Dutch chose to develop their own plantations in the Guyana region.
However, unlike the English and French colonies, these did not benefit from a large
and protected home market and their tropical products had to compete with the
products of other European colonies on the Amsterdam market. According to de
Vries, the fourth phase started at the end of the eighteenth-century and lasted until
the present day. The main characteristic of this phase is a shift from trade to invest-
ment. For instance, since the 1780s the Dutch have been major investors in the
United States.
De Vries’ scheme has the great advantage of favouring precision over undue
aggregation and of focusing not simply on the Dutch empire, but rather on Dutch
activities in the entire Atlantic. Nevertheless, we believe that, for all of its merits, this
four-phase developmental scheme is in need of adjustment too. While de Vries sug-
gests a succession of discrete phases, we propose that in the Dutch Atlantic, the
second phase, the active and cross-empire engagement with the entire Atlantic
trade, was to a large extent simultaneous with the third one, the construction and
running of plantation economies. This simply reflects the diversity within the Dutch
Atlantic. And incidentally, if we take the eighteenth-century Dutch cross-imperial
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commercial activities seriously, we can easily observe the continuity with de Vries’
fourth phase.
3. Framing a Dutch Atlantic Approach
The previous section outlines what the existing historiography allows us to say
about the defining characteristics of the Dutch Atlantic, including crucial develop-
ments and appropriate periodisations. But where does the study of the Dutch in the
Atlantic fit in the burgeoning field of Atlantic history as a whole? After all, Atlantic
history has been appearing ever more frequently in academic discourse for the past
two decades.76 However, the Dutch do not seem to figure into this academic dis-
course much. The exception might be research into the Atlantic slave trade and the
resultant analyses of the omnipresence of slavery in the early modern Americas,
which is the area of Atlantic studies in which the Dutch are most conspicuous.77 As
historian Alison Games has argued, colonial historians unhappy with the restrictions
of looking exclusively at their “own” empires have also been at the forefront of
creating Atlantic history; but Dutch colonial historians have not generally engaged
with Atlantic history as a whole.78 What most of Atlantic history has in common is a
strong North Atlantic, Anglo-American bias, which leaves out the Dutch, among
others. This commonly heard critique has, to some extent, helped balance out the
treatment of various other nations’ endeavours in the Atlantic, a prime example
being the more prominent place of the Iberian Atlantic in Atlantic studies. But
this, of course, does not mean that all constituent parts of the Atlantic world are
treated evenly, as is seen in the case of the Dutch, and it certainly does not mean
that the interconnectedness of the entire Atlantic is actually analysed and contextu-
alised.
Another line of criticism levelled at Atlantic history is that there is really nothing
new about it at all, and that it is just a re-writing of European (and Eurocentric)
history in a more politically correct manner.79 O’Reilly labels this “an attempt at
replacing one European, or Anglo-Saxon, or First World, hermeneutic system of
comprehending the past with another.”80 Along these lines, David Hancock issued
his now famous warning that “The Atlantic history perspective, if it is to be anything
more than boiled-over imperial history, must accentuate cross-boundary
exchanges.”81 With this statement, Hancock gets to the heart of the most frequent-
ly heard criticism of Atlantic history: a lack of accentuation, indeed, in some cases,
a complete disregard, for the necessity of going beyond the boundaries of the
nation-state. As Lara Putnam argues, historians have used the nation-state and
national borders as “the default frame of reference and presumptive boundary of
extrapolation,” despite the fact that they are often superimposing such borders
retroactively on historical realities that occurred long before the nation-state itself
came into existence.82 Even some of the most innovative approaches to Atlantic his-
tory continued to employ the nation-state as the frame of reference.83 Thus, Atlantic
history continues to be studied and understood primarily from the perspective of
Europe and viewed within a single imperial geography.84
What these critiques cogently suggest, is that the large geographic unit of the
Atlantic itself, incorporating such a diversity of actors and including such a long
chronology requires a different approach, focusing on commonalities, conver-
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gences, and patterns stemming from interactions. This method of inquiry is one
that, by necessity, deemphasises any single place. As David Eltis asserts, “in the
early modern Atlantic, for the first time in human history there appeared a hemi-
spheric ‘community’ which was linked by economic, social and cultural networks”.85
For J.H. Eliot, the real value of Atlantic history is that “It encourages historians to
trace connections. But it also encourages them—or should encourage them—to
draw comparisons.”86
In essence, historians researching anything to do with the Atlantic these days are
engaged in a complex balancing act. They must acknowledge what historians such
as Peter Coclanis, Nicholas Canny, and Peter H. Wood, to name only a few, argue:
that it does not make much sense to frame Atlantic history in terms of nations.87
These historians view Atlantic history as a tool for transcending traditional imperial
approaches to history. Yet, ironically, as like-minded advocates of a non-national
approach to the Atlantic Philip D. Morgan and Jack P. Greene point out, “The
Atlantic as a whole may be too capacious an entity. Histories of the Atlantic world
…will always be extraordinarily difficult to accomplish; histories within the Atlantic
world—invariably slices of it—inevitably will prove more manageable.”88 And here is
summarised the heart of the paradox of engagement with Atlantic history. The basic
tenets of Atlantic history argue against employing a national approach. Yet the
exigencies of research make engaging in non-nationally-focused Atlantic history
difficult, at best.
In line with the historiographical trends in the study of the Atlantic we have out-
lined above, we believe that the most fruitful approach to studying the Dutch in the
Atlantic would be to take the focus away from the Dutch colonies per se, and,
rather, emphasise the collection of Dutch actors and colonies and their connections
to the wider Atlantic, while also questioning the very concept of “Dutchness” as it
was understood in the Atlantic. It is, of course, not particularly new to state that the
colonial “Dutch Atlantic” was anything but a cohesive and homogeneous entity. In
fact, as we mentioned in the beginning of this article, in the late 1990s, Pieter
Emmer and Wim Klooster, even argued that there was no Dutch Atlantic at all.89 But
of course, there were Dutch colonies and connections in the Atlantic, and as the
contributors to Riches from Atlantic Commerce make clear, the real and long
underestimated importance of Atlantic commerce for the Dutch Republic was con-
siderable.90 And, certainly, there is a large cultural legacy stemming from Dutch
Atlantic endeavours—the production of maps, drawings, paintings, and other
sources—not to mention the very idea of an Atlantic world itself emerging in the
early modern period.91
Indeed, as Jan de Vries postulated, the contradictory nature of the early modern
“Dutch” Atlantic may offer us the perfect test of the viability of the very concept of
an Atlantic world.92 Because we are studying the “expansion without empire” of the
most loosely “national” of all states involved—that is, the most cosmopolitan, the
least centralised, and so forth—we can study historical phenomena that were
transatlantic, hemispheric, and transnational without falling into the trap of nation-
al narratives and the limitations characteristic of the historiographies of other
nations’ admittedly larger, and also more centralised, Atlantic enterprises.93
Moreover, by raising historical discussion of the Atlantic world to a level that not only
incorporates but also transcends nations and empires, we have greater freedom to
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employ a variety of theoretical viewpoints for the writing of Atlantic history, and, in
this sense, build on the existing historiography of the Dutch in the Atlantic and
incorporate it in creating a new approach.
A particularly useful method for tracing such connections and drawing such
comparisons, especially as applied to the Dutch in the Atlantic, is the “cis-Atlantic”
approach advocated by David Armitage.94 Armitage delineated “circum-Atlantic his-
tory,” which examines the Atlantic experience as a whole; “trans-Atlantic history,”
which emphasises a comparative approach; and “cis-Atlantic history,” as a method
for locating a particular place, institution or commodity within an Atlantic context.
Thus, when using a cis-Atlantic approach, historians can focus on a particular port
city, an institution such as the Inquisition, or a particular commodity such as tobac-
co.95 But, most often, the cis-Atlantic perspective is used to interpret the history of
a particular geographical entity—a nation, a state, a region—in relation to the wider
Atlantic world.96 A particularly illustrative example of cis-Atlantic history is the
Chaunus’ monumental Séville et l’Atlantique, which tells the history of a particular
city in relation to the Atlantic as a whole.97 Of course, this is not to say that circum-
and/or trans-Atlantic approaches are not applicable to the ways in Dutch nodal
points functioned. They can be and are. Nevertheless, the cis-Atlantic approach
seems to us to be most applicable to frame research on the Dutch in the Atlantic—
to begin with each Dutch nodal point and work outward to the larger whole in a cis-
Atlantic fashion.
Nodal points, as we define them, are the geographical framework for a star-
shaped network from whence prolonged connections were maintained with other
hubs in the Atlantic. They were part of an integrated Atlantic network, and had a
formal dimension (a set of rules and contracts) and an informal one (family
contacts), as well as an illicit or extra-legal aspect, and commerce was one of the
determining factors in their functioning. They are defined as “Dutch” if Dutch actors
have played a primary role in the formation and operation of the nodal point.98 This
means we would not consider as Dutch nodal points places where the Dutch did
not exercise any formal control or did not govern the territory. By focusing on Dutch
nodal points, we believe it will be possible to establish both what is unique and what
is common in these particular places as the result of interactions and connections
between the local and the greater whole. Dutch nodal points played a pivotal role
in the exchange of goods and the study of nodal points certainly lends itself to
economic analysis. Yet, as Jacob Price pointed out long ago, the study of nodal
points goes beyond their economic relationships, especially with their respective
metropoles.99 Price’s analysis of these points incorporated the interweaving, com-
parison, and juxtaposition of not only commerce, but administration, people, and
ideas.100 Moreover, Price brought to the fore the vital import of hinterlands to the
functioning of nodal points, an insight we similarly believe should be integrated into
analyses of the Dutch in the Atlantic. Ultimately, as Peggy Liss and Franklin Knight
point out, “[Port] cities were far more than distribution points for the exchange of
goods and services and foci of political control and imperial defence. Cities were
rather the sum of the interaction of all these elements, centres of social and cultur-
al differentiation.”101
Thus, we cannot limit ourselves to economic networks in port cities or nodal
points. Our analysis should include demographic, social, cultural, intellectual, and
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political networks as well. Of course, the trouble with the concept of networks, to
paraphrase David Hancock, is that its heuristic value cannot be overstated, as net-
works are often undermined by their component parts.102 For instance, as Hancock
elucidates in his article on problematic networks, networks failed when problems
arose among the parties involved in negotiating terms for sharing, monitoring
agreements, responding to the all-too-frequent disasters that befell traders in the
early modern Atlantic, and in estimating the actual costs of the transactions in
which they engaged.103 Therefore, looking only at networks gives neither a full nor
completely accurate picture of how the early modern Atlantic actually functioned.
Additionally, of course, focusing on a specific middleman, network or commodity
always implies the risk of getting lost in that particular story at the expense of con-
textualising the narrative in a broader Atlantic framework.
Ironically, in attempting to achieve as broad an Atlantic perspective as possible,
we have closed the circle and come to believe in the importance of focusing on the
regional as much as on the international. Looking at the Atlantic world as a whole,
and on Dutch nodal points specifically, through the lens of nations or empires,
leads to an approach that can divide the world in strange ways. For instance, if we
look at Dutch nodal points such as Curaçao and St. Eustatius, or even any other
island of the Caribbean, we see that each existed within its own imperial trajectory
while sharing space with a rival power and participating in common regional trans-
formations. What we need to establish, instead, is the degree to which supranation-
al connections transcended colonial limitations, or even, perhaps, made these colo-
nial borders obsolete.104 Certainly, there was a kaleidoscope of mutually opposing
interests and often seemingly self-contradictory imperial impulses.105 As the work of
Claudia Schnurmann illustrates, regional interests, loyalties, and, in the end, iden-
tities were often supra-national and trumped the artificial divisions imposed by
national claims.106
With these various caveats in mind, we argue that the focus on nodal points will
help us to demonstrate how the interests of individuals, groups, and regions were
entangled in ever-shifting and often supra-national ways. By focusing on connec-
tions and interactions centred in and around these nodal points rather than on the
nation-state as an over-arching and determining entity, we believe researchers will
paint not only a more historically accurate picture, but also confront the paradox of
studying the role of the Dutch in the Atlantic from a national perspective. In show-
casing how Dutch ports functioned within a larger Atlantic world, we advocate an
amalgamation of analytical approaches—network theory, port-city perspectives,
regional foci, and what might ultimately be termed a multi-layered cis-Atlantic
approach—for describing experiences and connections that were multiracial, multi-
ethnic, multinational, and multi-imperial. Ultimately, our goal in advocating the
employment of such a combination of approaches to analysing the Dutch in the
Atlantic is to overcome artificial, but nonetheless enduring, divisions between histo-
ries usually distinguished from each other as internal and external, domestic and
foreign, or national and imperial.107 For we recognise that every methodological
construction and viewpoint that we take—connections and interactions, (cis)-
Atlantic, (Dutch) imperial, centre and periphery, European, Caribbean, South
American, African, colonial, regional, networks, cities, ports—functions in slightly
different ways, and each is relevant under different circumstances. They coexist and
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intersect, and all are necessary for understanding the reality of the Dutch in the
Atlantic between roughly 1680 and 1800.108
4. Conclusions, Questions, Hypotheses
We have argued that the need to overcome artificial divisions imposed by imperial
geographies compels us to take an approach that goes beyond the traditional
nationally-focused centre-and-periphery model of looking at the Atlantic. We believe
in studying nodal points and their connections beyond the strictly colonial orbit, but
we cannot escape the fact that the national, in this case the Dutch Republic, was
responsible for major components of life in the Atlantic world, in general, and in
Dutch nodal points specifically: components such as religious orientation, the sys-
tem of law, modes of governance, economic policy, language, or architecture.
We hope that the framework we propose will help scholars in gaining a better
understanding of the characteristics and overall significance of the “Dutch” Atlantic
in early modern times. Of course, our focus on Dutch nodal points, middlemen,
cross-imperial connections and networks implies that connectivity was more impor-
tant than formal empire, at least in the Dutch case. Beyond this one salient fact, at
this stage of research into the Dutch in the Atlantic between 1680 and 1800, there
are as many questions as there are answers. Therefore, apart from a few tentative
conclusions, this closing section offers hypotheses, suggestions and questions cen-
tred within the framework for analysing the Dutch in the Atlantic which we have pro-
posed in this article.
For instance, in the economic realm, one clear question has emerged: how were
the Dutch able to acquire a substantial part of Atlantic shipping and trade without
having a colonial empire? Perhaps a synthesis of information from various Dutch
nodal points can help in answering this question. Characteristic of the Dutch
Atlantic economy was the WIC’s weak central organisation, which was in clear con-
trast to the tight organisational structure of the VOC. Moreover, trade and finance
operated in a series of only partially interlinking networks. The Dutch colonies main-
tained strong connections with non-Dutch parts of the (wider) Caribbean. The
North American link was perhaps measurably of even greater significance, as was
the direct Dutch link to the North American colonies. There were certainly changes
over time in the intensity of the various connections, but researchers are still in the
process of quantifying these. What is clear is that geographical differences translat-
ed into divergent economic models and migration patterns. The immediate hinter-
lands were of little economic significance in the Caribbean territories, unless, of
course, we consider the surrounding non-Dutch colonies as hinterlands of Curaçao
and Statia. Hinterlands were of more importance to the early American posses-
sions, and they were crucial both for Elmina and for the Republic itself. The
divergence in patterns of economic growth between the various overseas Dutch
settlements reflected differences in natural resources and, therefore, their resulting
economic character (primarily oriented to trade or to production of tropical staples)
but also shifting opportunities over time throughout the Atlantic (for example
Curaçao versus Statia and Suriname versus Demerara).
In trying to establish a periodisation for the entire Dutch Atlantic, we need to take
this chronological variability into account. For all of its merits, the periodisation
REPOSITIONING THE DUTCH IN THE ATLANTIC 149
advanced by Jan de Vries is in need of refining. What approach may be helpful for
establishing an empirically more nuanced chronology of the Dutch Atlantic and its
internal and external connections? We could start by charting developments over
time for each of the various nodal points, including indications for the intensity of
external connections over time. As an alternative approximation, it is possible to do
the same for particular parameters (trade, migration and demographics, invest-
ments, books or maps produced, and the like). On the basis of such exercises, we
may aspire to mapping the entire “Dutch” Atlantic and its connections over time
and comparing the resulting dynamic analysis to periodisations advanced for the
wider Atlantic. Whether this is possible within the framework we propose for study-
ing the Dutch in the Atlantic remains to be seen. Whatever system of periodisation
we employ the fact remains that, within the Republic, structural changes in the
national economy were partly linked to the vicissitudes of the wider Atlantic econo-
my. In contrast to earlier received wisdom, it seems clear that the growth of Dutch
Atlantic shipping and finance was superior to the overall economic development of
Dutch international trade in this period. The question remains whether this growth
was on a par with Atlantic growth for other nations.
We do know that after its short-lived Golden Age the Republic was no longer a
major military power. The stability of the Dutch Atlantic was, therefore, highly
dependent on the nature of its relations with the British, French and Spanish. The
long century between the Third (1672–74) and Fourth (1780–84) Anglo-Dutch
Wars was remarkably tranquil, and the neutrality of the Republic facilitated the
brokering role of Dutch colonies and middlemen. The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War as
well as the era of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars exposed the fragili-
ty of the Dutch Atlantic. (Indigenous and slave resistance were never absent, but
these were only on a few occasions potentially fatal.) Moreover, the Dutch Atlantic
trade zones straddled the boundaries of mercantilism. This applies not only to
Curaçao and Statia, but equally to the Dutch-dominated alternative of Danish St.
Thomas. Such islands served a useful function for all the Atlantic sub-empires until
the demise of mercantilism, and became superfluous afterwards.
In terms of cultural and demographic interactions, it seems clear that, with the
exception of Elmina, the Dutch Atlantic colonies were all immigrant societies with
different proportions of European, African and, increasingly, Eurafrican inhabitants.
Numerically, the indigenous population was only of some significance in the
Guianas. The degree of interracial mixing varied from colony to colony and was
highest in Curaçao. By comparative Atlantic standards, the European segment in
all Dutch colonies was remarkably cosmopolitan. This heterogeneity had implica-
tions for the emergence and maintenance of external networks, but also for patterns
of creolisation. The diversity within the European segments of the population cor-
responded with a pragmatic toleration for religious diversity among the free popu-
lation, but also illustrates contrasting ideas about, and practices of, Christianising
the slave populations. There is little indication that the diverse national and religious
background of the European and/or white Creole population created divided loyal-
ties among the white population, with the glaring exception of late eighteenth-
century Demerara with its large British contingent.
Ultimately, one challenge is to establish whether the framework we have set down
makes sense as a methodology for approaching the study of the Dutch in the
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Atlantic between 1680 and 1800. But there is quite another, larger challenge which
emerges from this approach as well. And that is to question whether any of this is
really uniquely Dutch at all. Is the purported importance of the Dutch in the Atlantic
as middlemen, brokers, and cultural and economic intermediaries a question of a
slight difference in scale from that of other nations, or was there really a qualitative
difference? In answering this question, it may help to think not only of the intensi-
ty, but also of the design, of networks. There is a case for stating that the Dutch
Atlantic was highly decentralised, like a spider web rather than the typical hub-and-
spoke. Again, this begs the question of whether this metaphor is correct, but also
whether this would be indicative of a singular Dutch Atlantic “model.” Whether they
employ our framework or not, future discussions of the Dutch in the Atlantic need
to reflect on the extant historiography of the wider Atlantic: on how Dutch Atlantic
connections are represented, the nature of the distortions and lacunae, and
whether a fresh look at the Dutch in the Atlantic may inspire a re-evaluation of
Atlantic history at large. With Peter Coclanis’ argument for a “conjuncto-Atlantic”
approach in mind, perhaps this may also inspire some of us to rethink the relevance
of the “Dutch-in-the- Atlantic” experience for our understanding of world history at
large.109
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